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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
PARENT OF CHILD-STEP-FATHER'S

DuTY

TO SUPPORT

Wife brought proceedings under the Act of April 13, 1867, P. L. 78 and
amendments thereto (18 P. S. 1251 el seq.) against husband from whom she was
separated for support of herself and minor children. While that action was pending, she obtained a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and indignities. A support
order for the children was given, and custody awarded to h-er. The father later
moved to reduce the support order and to obtain custody. The mother married one
Frame in the meantime, the children living with her and Frame; and by agreement
of the parties the motion to reduce the support order was considered as one to
vacate it. Held, the support order would not be disturbed. Commonwealth ex
rel. Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa. Super. 147, 15 A. (2d) 76 (1940).
Although this result was no doubt proper in light of the prevailing Pennsylvania law and the equities shown by the circumstances, the case nevertheless opens
up interesting questions in relation to the duties of a step-father who has taken the
children of his wif'e to live with him, during the life of the natural father.
Counsel for the father argued that here, it was the duty of the step-father to
support these children. The court quoted the settled rule that a divorce does not
terminate the father's obligation in this regard, and went on to state the equally
settled rule that the step-father, as such, is under no duty to support his step-children. The court said that there is no presumption that support furnished by him
is gratuitous, evidently reasoning that, this being so, it shows that no duty to support rests on the step-father.
This reverse logic, though of very questionable validity, might not be unacceptable if the premise on which it is based is true. The court cites, in support
of the doctrine that support furnished by a step-father is not presumed to be
gratuitous, the case of Estate of McCormick, minors, 18 Phila. 60. That case is
no authority for this proposition, although the step-father there was allowed compensation for support furnished, b-ecause there was an express agreement that he
should be so compensated.
The court also cites 46 C. J. § 183, p. 1338, and 20 R. C. L. § 10, p. 594.
These authorities do lay down this proposition as the general rule, but both go on
to say that if the step-father voluntarily assumes the care of his step-childrenplaces himself in loco parentis to them-he becomes liable in the same way that
the natural father would be. It could certainly be contended that in the case under
discussion, the step-father did exactly that. The court does not discuss the "inloco
parentis" theory except to say that the step-father's knowledge of the support order,
and the demand that the natural father support the child, negatives any idea that
he, in taking them in, intended to be liable for their support.
The cases on which the rule stated in these texts is based open up the problem
to which this note is directed. There are a number of Pennsylvania cases expressing the same view as the texts above referred to, namely that the step-father upon
placing himself in loco parentis becomes liable for support; but the statement of
that rule is in every case dictum.
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Thus, in Ruckman's Appeal, 61 Pa. 251 (1869), compensation for support
furnished was not allowed to the step-father. The court said that, because of the
relationship, the support furnished was presumed to be furnished gratuitously.
The same decision was given in Douglas's Appeal, 82 Pa. 169 (1876) and in
Duffey v. Duff ey, 44 Pa. 399 (1863). In all these cases, the same reasoning will
be found-by assuming the relation of in loco parentis, the step-father takes upon
himself the father's duty to support the child, and support furnished in performance of that duty is presumed to be gratuitous. But, these being all suits for compensation, the statement that the duty to support the step-children devolved on
the step-father is unnecessary to the decision. Once the step-father assumes the
support of the child, the presumption that it is being don'e gratuitously is applicable, because of the relationship, without regard to the prior existence of a duty. So,
this type of case cannot be said to establish the rule that a step-father comes under
a positive duty to maintain his wife's children which would be enforceable against
his will. But it could be contended that the dicta show a tendency to impose such
obligation.
The case of Commonwealth v. Walburn, 45 C. C. 619 (1917) also says, by
way of dictum, that an assumption of the relation of in loco parentis imposes liability for support on the step-father. Although the actual holding of this case is
unsatisfactory, the case is of value as re-stating what seems to have been the accepted view, correct or not, of the Pennsylvania courts. See also, as based on the
same premise, Lantz v. Frey, 14 Pa. 201 (1850). Brown's Appeal, 112 Pa. 18, 5
AtI. 13 (1886) is also some indication of the assumed view that taking upon himself the support and care of the children will impose the duty of maintenance on a
step-father.
So, although a flat decision on the point seems never to have been required
from the courts of this Commonwealth, the cases did seem to assume that a stepfather could become bound to support his step-children by assuming the position
of parent. It is interesting to note that in the Duffey case, supra, the same rule was
stated, by dictuni, although the natural father was living at the time the support
was furnished. That fact apparently did not induce the court to depart from the
often repeated assumption that such was the rule.
As adding strength to this rule-by-dictum, the case of McWilliams v. Kinney,
180 Ark. 836, 22 S.W. (2d) 1003 (1930) is worthy of note. Admittedly balancing the equities, the court refused to decree a support order against the natural
father of the child. The special circumstances of the case undoubtedly justified
holding the step-father liable for the continued support of the child, and the court
refused to cast the duty back on the natural father so long as the step-father was
financially capable of supporting the child. A note in 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 624 expresses the view that such procedure is allowable and justifiable so
long as the welfare of the child is not adversely affected.
Now, after having built up one theory, by way of argument, over a long
period of years, and having some foreign support of it, the Superior Court was presented, apparently for the first time, with a case in which the problem was directly
laid before it. Not only did the Court refuse to rule in accord with its former
dicta, which would have increased the duties of a foster parent beyond those imposed by the prevailing general rule; but it even indicated a tendency to narrow
the rule by saying that support already given is not presumed to be a gratuity and
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that taking in the children with knowledge that they have an existing income
(which is in itself begging the question), negatives any idea that he is assuming
their support.
Whether in the future our Courts will impose greater or lesser liability on
step-parents, or continue to follow the prevailing rule in their actual decisions, is
now a matter of conjecture. It is impossible to determine whether the Stack case
is an out-and-out repudiation of the whole of the former argument and so will result in entitling the step-father to compensation for support already given; whether
compensation will still be disallowed solely on the ground of the relationship existing; whether the liability and rights of the step-father will remain as before; or
whether the courts will at some time re-trace their steps and hold a step-father
under an absolute duty to support the child, prior to any support actually being
given. Of course, it seems hard to fit in a step-father under the wording of any
of our support statutes; but this has not always been an insuperable obstacle to the
J.P.M.
courts.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-FEDERAL COURTs-EFFECT OF CHANGE OF

STATE LAW PENDING APPEAL

Plaintiff, a citizen of Arizona, sought in U. S. District Court of Ohio, compensation from her employer, an Ohio corporation, for silicosis and other occupational diseases allegedly contracted through employer's negligence. Petition was
dismissed by trial court on the ground that neither the Workmen's Compensation
Act nor the common law of Ohio permitted recovery for the types of occupational
disease involved. Subsequently, pending appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Ohio Supreme Court, expressly overruling prior cases, declared such diseases
compensable under Ohio common law. Dismissal of the petition was affirmed by
the Circuit Court holding that a decree correct when entered will not be reversed
because of a subsequent decision changing the state law on which that decree was
based. Held, Judgm'ent reversed; intervening and conflicting state decisions will
cause reversal cif lower court's judgments which were correct when entered. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 61 S. Ct. 347 (1940).
In its early history, the Rules of Decision statute ("The laws of the several
States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." R. S.
§ 721, 28 U. S. C. A. § 725) was construed largely in its literal sense. Except for
occasional intimations to the contrary, "the laws of the several states" was taken to
mean "unwritten" as well as "written" law. But in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 3, 10
L. Ed. 865 (1842), Justice Story cleared the way for a long line of cases enunciating the principle that federal courts were not bound to adhere to the pronouncements o state courts in matters arising under the common law. See cases collected
in 28 U. S. C. A. § 725, note 6, et seq.
The freedom of federal courts under Swift v. Tyson understandably led to
several holdings to the effect that where a federal trial court did base its decision
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upon state law its holding would not be reversed because of a subsequent change,
pending appeal, in interpretation of the state law by the state courts. Morgan v.
Curtenius, 20 How. 1, 15 L. Ed. 823 (1859); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20,
33; Concordia Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 282 U. S. 545, 553. See other cases in 28 U.
S. C. A. 725, notes 10 & 11. Although the Court does not so indicate, all these cases
involve questions of interpretation of state statutes. Presumably, even after Swift v.
Tyson federal courts were bound to follow state interpretation in such matters. See
cases collected in 28 U. S. C. A. § 725, note 6. But the cases above reveal that even
this obligation was denied on occasion where state interpretation varied during the
course of an appeal. A fortiori, no obligation would have been felt to reverse on
appeal in order to comply with a state court's change of view on a common law
question.
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938) while constituting an about-face in the law and re-asserting the original view that state law,
as declared by the highest state court, should bind federal courts on common law
questions, gave no answer to the question, at what point in the proceedings the
state law would be regarded as settled.
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. undertakes to answer that question
and to substitute clarity for the confusion of prior cases, adopting as the "true rule"
the statement in U. S. v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110, 2 L. Ed. 49 (prior
to Swift v. Tyson) : "It is in the general true that the province of an appellate
court is only to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not.
But if subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court,
a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed, or its obligation denied." (The "law" here was a treaty.)
It might seem that the rule to be followed after Erie R. R. v. Tompkins might
have been derived by the simple expedient of referring to decisions prior to Swift
v. Tyson. But the necessity for a clarifying opinion grew out of the fact that, during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, two inconsistent groups of decisions were turned
out: those referred to above to the effect that subsequent changes in state interpretation would not cause reversal of trial courts which had followed prior state interpretations, and cases in harmony with U. S. v. Schooner Peggy. See cases cited
in instant case at 349, 350. Choosing the latter line of decisions as preferable and
as indicating that "the dominant principle is that nisi prius and appellate tribunals
alike should conform their orders to the state law as of the time of the entry," the
Court concludes that, "until such time as a case is no longer sub judice, (italics
ours) the duty rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision statute in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state
court." (Incidentally, the Court reiterates its recent holdings that, for the purpose
of the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, "highest state court" may mean intermediate
appellate courts. Footnote 21, p. 350. Cf. In re Hopper-Morgan Co. (D. C. N.
Y., 1907) 154 F. 249, and Bertlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills (C. C. A. N. J.,
1923) 287 F. 769.)
R.G.
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NEGLIGENCE-INFANTs-ACTION

FOR PRE-NATAL INJURIES

An action was brought by an infant, by his father as next friend and by his
father and mother individually, against a physician for personal injuries to the
infant plaintiff and consequential damages sustained by other plaintiffs as a result
of defendant's malpractice in treating infant plaintiff's mother prior to his birth.
Held, a doctor who knew or should have known of the existence of a child in the
womb of a mother treated by him, owed a duty to that child, and an action lies on
its behalf after its birth to recover damages for injuries negligently inflicted upon
it prior to its birth by such physician and for any consequential damages resulting
therefrom to its parents. Stemmer et al. v. Kline, - N. J. L. - 17 A. (2d) 58
(1940).
This case was decided shortly after the same problem had been disposed of in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 339
Pa. 547, 16 A. (2d) 28 (1940). In the latter case an action was instituted by an
infant, by his father and next friend, and by his father in his own right, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff prior to his birth. Held, an infant may not maintain an actioki for injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere.
Prior to the case of Stemmer et al. v. Kline, supra, the rule was accepted universally that an infant could not recover for pre-natal injuries inflicted negligently.
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, 20 A. L. R. 1503; Dierich v.
-Northampton,138 Mass. 14, 20 A. L. R. 1503; Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184
Ill. 359,56 N. E. 638; Buel v. United R. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 11; Ryan
v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. (2d) 52;
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. . 169, 49 Atl. 704. Reasons given in these decisions
which deny the right of a child to recover in a tort action for pre-natal injuries inflicted by defendant's fault are summarized by Justice Pound in the case of Drobner
v. Peters, supra., as, "Lack of authority, practical inconvenience and possible injustice, no separate entity apart from the mother, and therefore no duty of care, no
person or human being in erse at the time of the accident." In refuting these decisions, Judge Oliphant in Stemmer et al. v. Kline, supra, points out that in cases
involving the property rights of a child en ventre sa mere such child has been given
the same rights as in most cases as if he had been born. For all purposes beneficial
to the infant after birth, an infant en ventre sa mere is considered as born. Doe v.
Clarke, 214 Black 400, 126 Eng. Rep. R. 617. An estate may be given or bequeathed it. Marsellis v. Thalbimer, 2 Paige N. Y. 35, 21 Am. Dec. 66. Such an
infant may have a guardian appointed for it; he may have an injunction; he may
take by descent or devise. Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 691; Biggs v.
McCarthy, 86 Ind. 352; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340. Then too at common
law, if the mother be quick with child, the child was recognized as a separate entity
apart from the mother and as a person. State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 51 Am.
Dec. 248.
Judge Oliphant also applies the criminal law applicable in offenses committed
against an infant en ventre sa mere in the determination of the case. Even though
the death of an infant was caused by injuries inflicted prior to his birth, if the child
is born alive it is still homicide. Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 S. 671; State v.
Houre, 25 Iowa128. Since assault and battery is a component part of every murder committed by force, he assumes that an indictment for assault and battery would
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lie. Proceeding on this assumption, he reasons that an action sounding in damages
for that tort should be allowed.
The appellate courts of Pennsylvania had never considered this problem prior
to the case of Berlin et al. v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., supra. It had arisen in a lower
court in this state in the case of Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 D. & C. 227, in which it was
decided that a child born with a deformity, as the loss of a hand, caused by the
negligence of another while it was en ventre sa mere, can maintain an action by its
next friend to recover damages from the person who inflicted them, Refusing to
follow this view, Chief Justice Schaeffer enunciates the common law doctrine that
the child was not deemed to have an existence apart from the mother and hence an
injury to the unborn child is an injury to the mother, and lays down the flat rule
that in absence of statute there are no grounds for holding that a cause of action
for pre-natal injuries to the child arises at birth. He cites as authority therefor
Drobner v. Peters, supra; Dietrich v. Northampton, supra; Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, supra; and Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, supra, and
Rest. of the Law of Torts, (1934) vol. 4, sec. 869.
The rule laid down in the case of Stemmer et al. v. Kline, supra, is expressly
limited to the facts of that case. However, it would appear from Judge Oliphant's
decision that such rule will be extended and applied generally in New Jersey in
direct contrast to the rule as it exists in Pennsylvania today.
A. A. B.

